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USE OF CRIMINAL STATUTES IN TORT CASES
IN MISSOURI
Historically, tort causes of action have been created by court decision and
not by statutory enactment. However, courts have looked to legislative
pronouncements, in the form of criminal statutes, to define and supplement
the common law of torts.2 This note examines the influence criminal stat-
utes3 have had on tort law in Missouri.
Negligent and intentional torts are considered separately to facilitate clar-
ity of analysis; considerations and issues paramount to liability in one type
of tort action play only a minor role in the other. Criminal statutes have
substantially affected the duty, breach, and limitation of liability issues in
negligence4 cases. Their main impact on intentional tort liability, when
courts have been willing to use criminal statutes at all, has been in creating
new causes of action.
What are and should be the issues dealt with by the courts in determin-
ing whether to impose civil liability for conduct which breaches a criminal
statute? Should the courts be confined to statutory construction, to making
a finding of whether or not there is an expressed or implied intention of the
legislature to impose civil liability for conduct which violates a criminal stat-
ute? Or should the courts be free to choose which statutes and under what
circumstances liability will be imposed? These are the issues central to the
problem dealt with in this note.
I. NEGLIGENT TORTS
A. Duty
The breach of a criminal statute does not affect the duty issue in a negli-
gence case unless there is a concomitant common law duty of due care
applicable to the defendant's conduct. Criminal statutes have been inter-
preted as defining, particularizing, or expanding the scope of existing duties,
but never as creating a duty where none existed at common law.
In Missouri, there are three examples of situations in which no common
law duty of due care is imposed. (1) A landowner has no duty to protect
1. PRossER, TORTS § 4, at 19-21 (3d ed. 1964).
2. Id. § 35, at 191-205.
3. Throughout this note, the word "statutes" includes ordinances, unless a distinction
is clearly made.
4. References to negligence apply equally to contributory negligence, unless a distinc-
tion is clearly made.
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licensees' or trespassers' from dangerous conditions. (2) A landowner
has no duty to remove natural accumulations of snow and ice from side-
walks which abut his land.7 (3) A landlord has no duty to inspect leased
premises for dangerous conditions or to remedy such conditions.8 Legisla-
tion has been enacted by municipal governments which requires the land-
owner to eliminate the existence of dangerous conditions on his land,' to
remove snow and ice from abutting sidewalks,1" and to repair dangerous
conditions on leased premises.1" While conduct which violates these enact-
ments renders the defendant liable criminally, the courts have refused to
allow the enactments to serve as grounds for imposition of civil liability. 2
In the first group of cases, attempts have been made to apply the criminal
ordinances to cover injuries to both trespassers and invitees. The latter clas-
sification of plaintiffs has a common law right of recovery for injuries
caused by unsafe conditions. The legislation is construed merely as provid-
ing a criminal sanction for conduct which violates the concomitant common
law duty and not as extending civil liability to cover injury to trespassers,
who enter the land uninvited and at their own risk.1 3
5. Walters v. Markwardt, 361 Mo. 936, 237 S.W.2d 177 (1951); Lentz v. Schuerman
Bldg. & Realty Co., 359 Mo. 103, 220 S.W.2d 58 (1949); Ford v. Rock Hill Quarries
Co., 341 Mo. 1064, 111 S.W.2d 173 (1937).
6. Wells v. Henry W. Kuhs Realty Co., 269 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1954); Kelly v. Benas,
217 Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 557 (1909).
7. Hart v. City of Butler, 393 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1965); Russell v. Sincoe Realty Co.,
293 Mo. 428, 240 S.W. 147 (1922); Riley v. Woolf Bros., Inc., 236 Mo. App. 661,
159 S.W.2d 324 (1942).
8. Ford v. Rock Hill Quarries Co., 341 Mo. 1064, 111 S.W.2d 173 (1937); Corey
v. Losse, 297 S.W. 32 (Mo. 1927). Only if the lease provides that the landlord shall
make repairs does he have such a duty. Correy v. Losse, supra; Croskey v. Shawnee
Realty Co., 225 S.W.2d 509 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949).
9. See Wells v. Henry W. Kuhs Realty Co., 269 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1954).
10. See'Russell v. Sincoe Realty Co., 293 Mo. 428, 240 S.W. 147 (1922).
11. ST. Louis, Mo., REv. CODE vol. 2, §§ 2125.1, 2126.4 (1960).
12. Corey v. Losse, 297 S.W. 32 (Mo. 1927) (landlord-tenant); Russell v. Sincoe
Realty Co., 293 Mo. 428, 240 S.W. 147 (1922) (abutting sidewalk case); see Breen v.
Johnson Bros. Drug Co., 297 Mo. 176, 248 S.W. 970 (1923) (abutting sidewalk case);
Wells v. Henry W. Kuhs Realty Co., 269 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1954) (landowrier-trespasser).
The Wells case is particularly helpful in drawing the distinction between situations in
which there is no concomitant common law duty and situations in which such a duty
exdsts. The court pointed out that normally a landowner owes no duty to protect a
trespasser from dangerous conditions; hence, the criminal statute would have been of
no avail to the trespasser. However, the court went on to say that in this case, the
attractive nuisance or turntable doctrine might apply, creating a common law duty; only
iti this cate would the court permit the statute to be used.
13. See Wells v. Henry W. Kuhs Realty Co., supra not& 12. It is interesting to note
that this reasoning would not support a decision which denies the right of a licensee,
who is rightfully on another's land from using the statute to create civil liablity. The
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Courts have refused to use ordinances to impose civil liability on abutting
landowners in snow and ice removal cases, stating that the enactments are
attempts to force the landowners to discharge the city's responsibility. 4
Despite the ordinances, the city remains ultimately responsible for the con-
dition of the sidewalks." However, a great many pedestrians suffer injuries
on city sidewalks without recourse against the municipality. The city is liable
only if the condition is not prevalent generally on city sidewalks" and if the
condition has existed for some substantial period of time.'7
Refusal to base civil liability on the landlord-tenant ordinances rests on
two grounds: (1) the intent of such ordinances was to prevent blight,
rather than to protect tenants from injury,' 8 and (2) no such duty exists in
Missouri's common law, and a municipality may not alter the law of the
state." The first reason is vulnerable to the criticism that many dangerous
conditions which are violations of the ordinance do not amount to blight,2
while the second fails to observe that it is the court using the ordinance,
rather than the city creating the ordinance, which would be altering the law
of the state. Many jurisdictions have used similar ordinances as the basis for
creating a duty in landlord-tenant cases. 2'
Missouri courts have not had to consider this question; however, there is a dictum in
Well to the effect that a licensee could not use the statute to create a duty.
14. Russell v. Sincoe Realty Co., 293 Mo. 428, 240 S.W. 147 (1922); see Breen v.
Johnson Bros. Drug Co., 297 Mo. 176, 248 S.W. 970 (1923) (dictum).
15. Walsh v. St. Louis, 346 Mo. 571, 142 S.W.2d 465 (1940); Stith v. J.J. Newberry
Co., 336 Mo. 467, 79 S.W.2d 447 (1935); Young v. City of St. Joseph, 4 S.W.2d 1104
(Mo. Ct. App. 1928); Krucker v. City of St. Joseph, 195 Mo. App. 101, 190 S.W. 644
(1916) (dictum).
16. O'Brien v. City of St. Louis, 355 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1962); Luettecke v. City of
St. Louis, 346 Mo. 168, 140 S.W.2d 45 (1940); Gudorp v. City of St. Louis, 372 S.W.2d
483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); cf. Everett v. WalIbrun, 273 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. Ct. App.
1954); Woodley v. Bush, 272 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954).
17. Walsh v. St. Louis, 346 Mo. 571, 142 S.W.2d 465 (1940); Vonkey v. City of St.
Louis, 219 Mo. 37, 117 S.W. 733 (1909); Gudorp v. City of St. Louis, 372 S.W.2d 483
(Mo. Ct. App. 1963).
18. See Corey v. Losse, 297 S.W. 32 (Mo. 1927).
19. Corey v. Losse, supra note 18, at 32-33; Burnes v. Fuchs, 28 Mo. App. 279, 282
(1887); Mo. Rav. STAT. § 73.110 (1959).
20. This criticism, in turn, can be attacked by pointing out that a city has a valid
blight interest in remedying conditions which do not as yet amount to blight. More
specifically, it could be argued that structural disrepair is a cause of blight or is the
first step toward blight.
21. Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960); McNally
v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961); Rivera v. Grill, 65 N.J.
Super. 253, 167 A.2d 638 (1961); Frion v. Coren, 13 Wis. 2d 300, 108 N.W.2d
563 (1961); Prudhomme v. Berry, 69 So. 2d 620 (La. Ct. App. 1953) (by impli-
cation); Morningstar v. Stritch, 326 Mich. 541, 40 N.W.2d 719 (1950); Shass v.
Abgold Realty Corp., 198 Misc. 1052, 102 N.Y.S.2d 707 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Tkach v.
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Despite the asserted reasons for refusing to extend civil liability, all the
above situations can be explained by concluding that Missouri courts will
not use criminal statutes to create a cause of action in negligence cases in
which no concomitant common law duty of due care exists. This position
is apparently based upon the unarticulated belief that absent expressed or
strongly implied legislative intent, courts should not impose negligence li-
ability in new areas. However, there seems to be no evidence that legisla-
tures consider whether criminal statutes provide appropriate standards for
the imposition of civil liability.22 Further, the bulk of negligence law has
traditionally been created by court decision rather than legislative enact-
ment. Therefore, courts can extend and enlarge a defendant's duty on their
own initiative. Instead of limiting consideration of extension or creation of
a duty to expressed or implied legislative intent, courts can examine policy
considerations, such as who can best prevent or control injury and who can
best pay for or insure against the damages.23
B. Breach of the Duty
When there is an existing concomitant common law duty, evidence of
breach of a statute can be used to establish the defendant's negligence.
Proof of conduct which violates a statute can be "evidence of negligence" or
"negligence per se."'24 Missouri courts follow the latter alternative. 21
Montefiore Hosp., 289 N.Y. 387, 46 N.E.2d 333 (1943). See Morris, The Role of
Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUm. L. REv. 21, 23 & n.5 (1949).
22. See Morris, supra note 21, at 22; Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27
HAv. L. REV. 317, 329-30 (1914).
23. For example, in deciding whether the snow and ice removal ordinances should
create a civil duty, the courts could ask whether it is desirable to make an insurer out of
the abutting property owner; such a decision would not spread the risk as generally as
would a policy which broadens the scope of the municipality's liability. Nevertheless, the
ordinances provide an opportunity to protect the pedestrian, who in most cases receives
no compensation. E.g., O'Brien v. City of St. Louis, 355 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1962);
Luettecke v. City of St. Louis, 346 Mo. 168, 140 S.W.2d 45 (1940); Vonkey v. City of
St. Louis, 219 Mo. 37, 117 S.W. 733 (1909); Gudorp v. City of St. Louis, 372 S.W.2d
483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963). See generally James, Statutory Standards and Negligence
in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. Rxv. 95 (1950). Furthermore, the court could ask
whether the landowner or the city is in the best position to remove recent accumulations
,of snow and ice; the imposition of liability would certainly help motivate the party who
is held responsible.
24. PRossER, op. cit supra note 1, § 35, at 202-03; James, supra note 23, at 106; see
Note, 9 OxLA. L. Rzv. 98 (1956); Note, 11 S.C.L.Q. 207 (1959).
25. E.g., Beezley v. Spiva, 313 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1958); Wilson v. Shumate, 296
S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1956); Gaines v. Property Servicing Co., 276 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. 1955);
Fassi v. Schuler, 349 Mo. 160, 159 S.W.2d 774 (1942); Bowman v. Ryan, 343 S.W.2d
613 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); MacArthur v. Gendron, 312 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. Ct. App.
1958); Ashby v. Elsberry & N.H. Gravel Rd. Co., 99 Mo. App. 178, 73 S.W. 229
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1. Evidence of Negligence
In an evidence of negligence jurisdiction, proof of breach of the criminal
statute establishes a prima facie case of negligence. By itself, this proof will
not support a directed verdict. The jury considers the breach as it would
consider any other evidence of fault to determine whether the defendant
exercised the care a reasonably prudent man would have exercised under
the circumstances.2"
2. Negligence Per Se-The Law in Missouri
Proof of breach of a criminal statute in Missouri results, as a matter of
law, in a directed verdict" unless the court recognizes an excuse, or the
possibility of an excuse, for the breach. If the breach of the statute is in
issue, the court submits an instruction which leaves the factual determina-
tion to the jury but directs a finding of negligence if the jury finds the
breach. Under the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions, the court would
submit the following type of instruction to the jury:
Your verdict must be for the plaintiff if you believe:
Defendant was driving over 30 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour
speed zone .... ..
Adoption of the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions in 1964 by the
supreme court apparently resolved any doubts that the state followed the
negligence per se approach. Prior to this, several cases used the evidence
of negligence terminology when a statute had been breached. These cases
fell into two categories: (1) one case in which the court used the words
"evidence of negligence" but in fact gave the breach of the statute a negli-
gence per se effect,2" and (2) those in which the plaintiff did not plead the
(1903); Skinner v. Stifel, 55 Mo. App. 9 (1893); cf. Gas Serv. Co. v. Helmers, 179
F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1950); Swigart v. Lusk, 196 Mo. App. 471, 192 S.W. 138 (1917).
But see PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 35, at 203; Morris, The Role of Criminal
Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 21, 34 & n.50 (1949). Both of these
works comment on Cantwell v. Cremins, 347 Mo. 836, 149 S.W.2d 343 (1941).
26. PRossER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 35, at 202-03; James, supra note 23, at 106;
Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HAav. L. Rzv. 453, 456
(1933).
27. Cases cited note 25 supra.
28. See Missouri Approved Jury Instructions (hereinafter cited MAI), Change No.
18 (Supp. June 1964). This instruction further requires that the jury must find that the
breach of the statute caused the plaintiff's damages. The question of cause in fact is
not discussed in this note because no Missouri cases suggest problems which are peculiar
to statutory torts. For a discussion of some causation problems which may arise when a
statute has been- breached see BECHT & MILLERP, FACTUAL CAUSATION § 16 (1961).,
29. Cantwell v. Cremins, 347 Mo. 836, 149 S.W.2d 343 (1941).. The supreme
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statute as the basis for a finding of negligence, but merely pleaded common
law negligence, and introduced the statute as proof thereof."0 In the latter
cases, the courts treated the breach of the statute as evidence of negligence,
and might well do so today.3' However, since the plaintiff is allowed to
plead in the alternative, 2 there seems to be no valid reason for a failure to
plead the statute as the basis of liability.
3. Excused Breach
The defendant may be able to avoid a directed verdict by pleading an
excuse, demonstrating that he had a valid reason for violating the statute.
The allowance of an excuse is based on the premise that a criminal statute
court said that breach of the pertinent statute was evidence of negligence.
Id. at 842, 149 S.W.2d at 346. Yet, the court went on to hold that the breach of the
statute created a presumption of negligence which would support a directed verdict;
only if the defendant proved that he had a valid excuse for violating the statute could
he avoid a directed verdict.
However, in Manar v. Taetz, 109 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937), it seems that
the court followed the evidence of negligence theory. The court stated, "We agree with
the court below that the case, upon the record made, was one to be submitted to the
jury upon the theory of defendants' actionable negligence arising out of their conceded
noncompliance with the requirements of the ordinance." Id. at 723. (Emphasis added.)
The implication is that the plaintiff was not entitled to a directed verdict, but had merely
made out a jury case. Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiff still had the burden
of establishing that the defendant was negligent. Ibid. The confusion caused by this
case was remedied three years later when the state supreme court held that a breach of
the same statute under similar circumstances constituted negligence per se. Monsour v.
Excelsior Tobacco Co., 144 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1940).
30. Cichacki v. Langton, 392 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1965); Dickerson v. St. Louis Pub.
Serv. Co., 286 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1956); Floyd v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 280 S.W.2d
74 (Mo. 1955) ; Hart v. Skeets, 346 Mo. 1118, 145 S.W.2d 143 (1940) ; Bailey v. Kansas
City, 189 Mo. 503, 87 S.W. 1182 (1905); Collins v. Leahy, 102 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1937) ; Lach v. Buckner, 229 Mo. App. 1066, 86 S.W.2d 954 (1935) ; McPherson v.
Premier Serv. Co., 38 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931).
One obvious question is why a plaintiff would use a statute to prove common law
negligence, when it could be used to get a directed verdict on a negligence per se theory.
In Floyd v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra, the trial court mistakenly directed the
plaintiff that he could plead either statutory negligence or common law negligence but
not both. The plaintiff chose to plead common law negligence and to use the breach of
the statute as evidence of this negligence, presumably because he was not sure that he
could establish the breach of the statute. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 30-36, Floyd v.
St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co, supra. In Hart v. Skeets, supra, it appears that the plaintiff
did not-realize that negligence per se was the law of Missouri. See Brief for Respondent,
pp. 14-24, Hart v. Skeets, supra.
31. Even with the acceptance of the Missouri Approved Instructions, there appears to
be no reason why evidence of negligence will not remain the rule when the plaintiff does
not plead the statute. See Cichacki v. Langton, 392 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1965). However,
the Approved Instructions do not provide for this exception to the negligence per se rule.
"32. Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.12.
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is not always an accurate standard against which fault can be measured."
For instance, in Rice v. Allen," the defendant had allowed the plaintiff to
drive his truck, which had defective brakes. Before doing so, he warned the
plaintiff that the brakes were not functioning. The plaintiff was injured
when he was forced to leap from the truck as it rolled down an incline.
Rice based his plea for relief on the breach of a statute requiring motor
vehicles to have two sets of adequate brakes, but the court recognized the
common law doctrine of warning as a complete excuse and directed a ver-
dict for the defendant."
Application of the negligence per se-excused breach doctrine can have
two other effects. The trial court can (1) hold as a matter of law that the
excuse is inadequate and direct the verdict for the plaintiff,"8 or (2) find
that the excuse is sufficient to avoid a directed verdict for the plaintiff but
insufficient to require a directed verdict for the defendant.' In the latter
cases, the jury determines the question of defendant's negligence by con-
sidering both the statutory breach and the exculpatory circumstances. 8
Missouri Approved Jury Instruction 17.01 provides the form for submit-
ting the issue of negligence to the jury in such situations. Using the Rice v.
Allen fact pattern as an example, the instruction would read:
33. See Lochmoeller v. Kiel, 137 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940). See also James,
supra note 23, at 107-08; Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability,
46 HARv. L. Rzv. 453, 458 (1933); Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence
Actions, 49 COLUM, L. REv. 21, 23, 32 (1949); Note, 1950 WASH. U.L.Q. 280; Note, 1
WILLAMETTE L.J., 503, 510-11 (1961).
34. 309 S.W.2d 629 (Mo. 1958).
35. The court noted that the defendant also had the valid defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk. However, it was careful to point out that it was
deciding the case on the issue of negligence. Id. at 631-32.
36. Bowman v. Ryan, 343 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); see Wilson v. Shumate,
296 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1956); MacArthur v. Gendron, 312 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. Ct. App.
1958).
37. Tener v. Hill, 394 S.W.2d 425 (Mo. Ct App. 1965); see Wilson v. Shumate,
296 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1956); Lix v. Gastian, 261 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. Ct App. 1953);
Lochmoeller v. Kiel, 137 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940).
In this situation the defendant must first convince the judge that the excuse was
sufficiently valid to allow a finding that due care may have been exercised and then
convince the jury that due care was exercised. These are, of course, close cases in which
the judge wishes to be insulated by the jury. Cf. GRxz, JUDGE AND JURY 158 (1930).
38. Tener v. Hill, 394 S.W.2d 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); MacArthur v. Gendron,
312 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958); Lix v. Gastian, 261 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. Ct. App.
1953).
The jury could consider the defendant's conduct by common law standards, as though
there were no statute involved in the case. This approach, however, is not explicit in
either the cases or the Approved Instructions.
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Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:
First, at the time of the accident the defendant did not have two sets
of adequate brakes; and
Second, defendant was thereby negligent.s9
This instruction, however, may not be adequate to inform the jury that it
must decide whether the defendant's warning should excuse his act of al-
lowing the plaintiff to drive the dangerous vehicle. In the interest of sim.
plicity,4" the instruction may create confusion because it fails to indicate in
sufficient detail the rational process the jury should follow in reaching a
decision. 1 A better balance between simplicity and sufficiency can be
achieved by altering the instruction to read:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:
First, at the time of the accident the defendant did not have two sets
of adequate brakes; and
Second, the defendant was thereby negligent and should not be ex-
cused by reason of his warning the defendant.
This instruction informs the jury that it must weigh the statutory breach
against the possibility that under the circumstances an excuse should be
accepted.42
Application of the negligence per se doctrine allows the court, by char-
acterizing the issue of negligence as a matter of law, to make it a question
for the judge rather than the jury. When an excuse is offered by the de-
39. M.A.I. No. 17.01 (1964).
40. "The Court's order appointing the Committee directed that measures be con-
sidered for simplifying instructions. This has been a primary goal." Surnus.n COuRT
CosM. ON JURY INSTRUCTiONS, REPORT TO MISSOURI SUPRESME COURT, MISsouRI
APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS XVII (1964).
41. A further purpose of the Approved Jury Instructions should be noted:
Each pattern instruction was also subjected to these four tests: ....
(2) Is it a complete statement? Ibid.
42. Another method of presenting the excuse would be for the defendant to submit
a converse instruction. Using the Rice ease in conjunction with converse instruction
M.A.I. No. 29.05(2), the defendant's instruction would read:
Your verdict must be for defendant if you believe that defendant gave sufficient
warning of the dangerous condition of the brakes to excuse defendant for
allowing the vehicle to be driven without two sets of adequate brakes.
The" problem with this method of hypothesizing the excuse is that when the defendant
uses a converse instruction, he assumes the burden of persuasion for the proposition
presented in that instruction. See M.A.I. No. 29.01, at 240; SUPREME COURT CoMM.
ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Op. cit. supra note 40, at X-XI. Yet it appears from the cases
that when the excused breach doctrine prevents a directed verdict and the ultimate
issue is presented to the jury, the plaintiff still has the burden of persuasion. See Tener
v. Hill, 394 S.W.2d 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) ; see also Wilson V. Shumate, 296 S.W.2d
72 (Mo. 1956); Lix v. Gastian, 261 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953); Lochmoeller v.
Kiel, 137 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940).
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fendant, the judge's function is to rule on its legal validity and its effect on
the question of negligence. As previously noted, he may decide that the
excuse should not be recognized; that it should be recognized, but only to
the extent of avoiding a directed verdict for the plaintiff; or that it should
be recognized to the extent of requiring a directed verdict for the defendant.
Although the asserted reason for recognizing an excuse is that the de-
fendant, in spite of his breach of the statute, has acted as a reasonably pru-
dent man,43 the courts may give equal or greater weight to other considera-
tions in determining the recognition and effect it will give to an excuse. A
comparison of two types of cases illustrates the point. Courts have been
willing to recognize excuses for breaches of traffic statutes," but have refused
to do so when tenant- and employee-safety statutes are breached."5 Although
43. Authorities cited, note 33 supra.
44. E.g., Miles v. Gaddy, 357 S.W.2d 897 (Mo. 1962); Wilson v. Shumate, 296
S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1956); Tener v. Hill, 394 S.W.2d 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Bunch
v. Crader, 369 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); Lochmoeller v. Kiel, 137 S.W.2d 625
(Mo. Ct. App. 1940); see Note, I WILLAMETTE L.J. 503, 511 (1961). See also Morris,
The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 21, 33 (1949).
45. In Monsour v. Excelsior Tobacco Co., 115 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938), the
defendant had breached an ordinance which required landlords of tenement houses to pro-
vide a light in the common halls and stairways. The defendant asserted that the light
had not been out for a sufficient time for a reasonable man to discover and replace the
bulb. The court replied, "Defendant's duty to furnish light for the common halls and
stairways was an absolute duty created by ordinance, so that any nonobservance of such
duty was negligence per se. . . ." Id. at 222. A new trial was granted on other grounds,
however, and the case subsequently came to the Missouri Supreme Court, which held that
because there was sufficient lighting from sources other than the stairway light, the ordin-
ance had not been breached. Monsour v. Excelsior Tobacco Co., 144 S.W.2d 62 (Mo.
1940). The supreme court did not have the opportunity to comment on the state-
ment of the court of appeals that failure to light the stairway could not be excused.
Yet, the two holdings do not appear inconsistent; it is possible to hold that compliance
with legislation does not require literal compliance with the wording of the legislation and
still hold that noncompliance may not be excused. There have been no subsequent cases
based on this ordinance.
In Ranus v. Boatmen's Bank, 279 Mo. 332, 214 S.W. 156 (1919), the defendant
breached a statute which required owners of dormitories to provide fire escapes. He was
held liable despite his excuse that he did not know that the building was being used
as a dormitory. Hake v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 234 S.W. 1061 (Mo. Ct. App. 1921),
dealt with an ordinance which required that elevator shafts be adequately guarded.
Defendant provided a guard but it was left open and plaintiff fell into the shaft. The
court held that the ordinance had not been violated. Id. at 1066-67. However, because
the statute does not appear to allow temporary non-compliance, it would have been
more reasonable to hold that the statute had been breached, but the breach should be
excused. The holding that there was no violation may be indicative of the courts'
reluctance to find that a breach of an employee safety statute can be excused. See
Phillips v. Hamilton Brown Shoe Co., 178 Mo. App. 196, 165 S.W. 1183 (1914). See
also Burt v. Nichols, 264 Mo. 1, 173 S.W. 681 (1915).
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unarticulated, certain policy considerations may be the actual basis for dis-
tinguishing between the two situations.48
The ultimate effect of initially characterizing negligence as a question for
the judge, rather than the jury, is that it allows courts to vary the degree of
fault necessary for the imposition of liability. By refusing to recognize ex-
cuses, a court can, in effect, hold that breach of some statutes creates abso-
lute liability, while freely recognizing that similar exculpatory circumstances
are sufficient to excuse breaches of other statutes.
By characterizing the issue of negligence as a matter of law, the court
avoids the appearance of trying to seize control of that issue."' The judge is
not faced with the task of removing the issue from the jury, but rather must
decide whether to give it to the jury.
C. Limitation of the Effect of the Statute
The courts have placed two limitations on the use of criminal statutes in
negligence cases: (1) the plaintiff must have been injured by the hazard
which the legislature intended to prevent or control, and (2) the plaintiff
must have belonged to the class of people the legislature intended the statute
to protect."'
In Mansfield v. Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co.,49 the defendant violated a stat-
ute requiring corporations
using any polishing wheel.., which generates dust, smoke or poison-
ous gases in its operation, [to] provide each and every such wheel or
46. For example, the approach taken toward the employee-safety statutes may have
been a harbinger of the doctrine of strict liability which was subsequently included in
the workmen's compensation statutes. One possible reason for not imposing strict liability
for violations of traffic statutes is that such an imposition would result in fewer recoveries.
A statute can be used to prove not only the defendant's negligence, but also the plaintiff's
contributory negligence. State ex rel. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. v. Bland, 354 Mo. 79,
188 S.W.2d 650 (1945); Fitzpatrick v. Kansas City So. Ry., 347 Mo. 57, 146
S.W.2d 560 (1940); Douglas v. Whitledge, 302 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957); Van
Sickle v. F.M. Stamper Co., 198 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947). Therefore, it
would be easier to prove not only negligence, which juries are already prone to find, but
also contributory negligence, which juries are hesitant to find. See James, Statutory
Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. Rav. 95, 108 (1950); Note, 1
WILLAMETTE L.J. 503, 512-13 (1961). The same is not true with tenant- and employee.
safety statutes because they are applicable only to the potential defendants.
47. See GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 278-79 (1930). See also HOLMES, THE COsissON
LAw 121-24 (1881).
48. Some courts have applied a third limiter: The interest which was injured must
have been the one which the legislature sought to protect. For example, the plaintiff
may not use the statute to recover for personal injuries if the legislature sought to protect
only property rights. See PROSSER, TORTS § 35, at 196-98 (3d ed. 1964). This issue
has not been raised in any Missouri case.
49. 294 Mo. 235, 242 S.W. 400 (1922).
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machine with a hood, which shall be connected with a blower or suc-
tion fan ... to carry off said dust, smoke and gases and prevent its
inhalation by those employed about said wheel ... .0
Wagner failed to install such a hood and a particle flew from the machine
and struck Mansfield in the eye. The court refused to allow him to use the
statute to prove negligence per se because the statute was designed to
protect employees from lung injuries."
In Stein v. Battenfield Oil & Grease Co.,5" the company contracted for
an electrician to make repairs on equipment. The electrician was killed when
he fell onto an unguarded motor belt. His wife sought to predicate her
claim of negligence on a statute that read:
The belting, shafting, machines, machinery, gearing and drums in all
manufacturing, mechanical and other establishments in this state,
when so placed as to be dangerous to persons employed therein or
thereabout while engaged in their ordinary duties, shall be safely and
securely guarded when possible.5"
The court construed the statute as being designed to protect employees
only. Because the plaintiff was an independent contractor, he was not
within the class of persons whom the statute was designed to protect. There-
fore the statute could not be used. "
When the statute is explicit as to the class of persons to be protected and
the hazards to be prevented, Missouri courts strictly apply the limiting
rules. 5 However, when it is not explicit, they have often construed the stat-
ute liberally to include the plaintiff and his injury." Both the class of
hazards and class of plaintiffs tests must be satisfied before the statute may
50. Mo. Rxv. STAT. § 292.120 (1959).
51. But see PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 48, § 35, at 198 & n.40. See generally
Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REv. 361, 375-76
(1932); Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HAnv. L. Rv.
453, 473-77 (1933); Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. Rav. 317,
335-42 (1914).
52. 327 Mo. 804, 39 S.W.2d 345 (1931).
53. Mo. REv. STAT. § 292.020 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
54. See also PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 48, § 35, at 193-96. See generally Lowndes,
supra note 51, at 375-76; Morris, The Relations of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability,
46 HARv. L. REv. 453, 473-77 (1933); Thayer, supra note 51, at 335-42.
55. See Stein v. Battenfield Oil & Grease Co., 327 Mo. 804, 39 S.W.2d 345 (1931);
Mansfield v. Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co., 294 Mo. 235, 242 S.W. 400 (1922); Glaser v.
Rothschild, 221 Mo. 180, 120 S.W. 1 (1909); Anderson v. Wells, 220 Mo. App. 19,
273 S.W. 233 (1925); Behre v. Kemp & Co., 191 S.W. 1038 (Mo. Ct. App. 1917).
56. See Marczuk v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 355 Mo. 536, 196 S.W.2d 1000
(1946); Phillips v. Henson, 326 Mo. 282, 30 S.W.2d 1065 (1930); Kuba v. Nagel, 124
S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939); Loehr v. Wells, 253 S.W. 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 1923).
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be employed. If the plaintiff is thus precluded from using the statute, his
negligence action is not necessarily defeated. He may still proceed, with no
mention of the statute,"7 to prove common law negligence, and the very
conduct which breached the statute may serve as proof of the lack of com-
mon law due care."8
II. INTENTIONAL TORTS
In Missouri, intentional tort claims can be founded on the breach of a
criminal statute only if" (1) the statute was designed to protect not only
the general public but also the class of plaintiffs of which the plaintiff is a
member,"0 and (2) the statute is in two parts, one remedial and the other
penal, the plaintiff basing his cause of action on the former.6" Both condi-
tions must be met.2 The distinction inherent in the second condition is the
most difficult to apply. In one case,"3 the court gave relief to a plaintiff who
57. Cf. Behre v .Kemp & Co., 191 S.W. 1038 (Mo. Ct. App. 1917).
58. See Anderson v. Wells, 220 Mo. App. 19, 273 S.W. 233 (1925).
59. See generally Comment, 63 HARv. L. Ray. 175 (1949); Comment, 50 Mial. L.
Rav. 352 (1951). The distinction between intentional torts and negligent torts is not
always easy to make. For example, when an unwed, pregnant woman sues the prospective
father for damages caused by the pregnancy, it is likely that the pregnancy was uninten-
tionally caused. However, the Missouri courts have considered such suits to be founded
on an intentional tort theory. See Heembrock v. Stevenson, 387 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1965); James -v. Hutton, 373 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963). The decisions
in both of these cases are based on the intentional tort case of Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo.
1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956).
Another problem arises when the plaintiff does not make clear to the court which
theory is relied upon. In Bailey v. Canadian Shield Gen. Ins. Co., 380 S.W.2d 378 (Mo.
1964), an insured sued an insurance agent for damages caused by the agent's act of
placing insurance with a company which had not been authorized to do business in
Missouri. Placing insurance with an unauthorized company was forbidden by statute;
any offender was subject to criminal liability. Mo. RBv. STAT. § 375.300 (1959). Rely-
ing on intentional tort cases, the court held that the statute did not create a cause of
action and, hence, the plaintiff could not recover. Yet the plaintiff probably had a sound
negligence case; at common law, an insurance agent owes a duty of at least due care
to his principal. City of New York Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 248 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1952);
Kaw Brick Co. v. Hogsett, 73 Mo. App. 432 (1898). Hence, if the insured had made it
clear that he was proceeding on a negligence theory, he may have recovered.
60. Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 192 S.W. 387 (Mo. 1917), aff'd on other
grounds, 359 U.S. 530 (1922). See Kepner, Violation of a Municipal Ordinance as Neg-
ligence Per Se in Kentucky, 37 Ky. L.J. 358 (1949). It should be noted that in Cheek,
the court relied on numerous negligence cases to support this proposition, but cited no
cases involving intentional torts. 192 S.W. at 387.
61. State ex rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Hughes, 350 Mo. 869, 169 S.W.2d 328
(1943).
62. See Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956).
63. Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 192 S.W. 387 (Mo. 1917), aff'd on other
grounds, 259 U.S. 530 (1922).
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predicated his cause of action on the failure of an employer to give him a
letter stating the services the employee had performed and the reason for
termination of the employment. A "service letter" statute 4 required employ-
ers to provide such letters to discharged employees. However, the court
refused relief to an employee discharged for asserting his rights under the
state's workmen's compensation statute.65 The statute contained a section
making it a crime to discharge an employee for trying to collect damages
under the statute.6"
The court distinguished the cases on the grounds that the workmen's
compensation statute was neither remedial nor in two parts. Criminal li-
ability was imposed in the latter case to prevent anticipated abuses of the
workmen's compensation statute, while in the former case the statute was
passed to correct an existing evil- that employers had hindered former em-
ployees in finding new jobs by refusing to discuss their past employment
records with prospective employers. Since workmen's compensation statutes
were of recent origin, there could be no existing evils associated with them,
the court reasoned. The court further held that a statute must have two
parts, one punitive and the other remedial, to serve as the basis for founding
liability on an intentional tort theory." This "two parts" issue is essentially
a rule of statutory construction that helps a court in its search for a legisla-
tive intent to provide a remedy. Punctuation becomes critical under such a
test. In the "service letter" case, the statute consisted of two sentences. The
first sentence imposed a duty on the employer to furnish a letter if requested
to do so, while the second dealt with the punishment that could be imposed
for failure to do so. The court thus read the statute as having a dual
purpose. In the workmen's compensation case, the court interpreted the
fact that the relevant provision was embodied in one sentence as indicating
that the provision was punitive only and did not have a dual role.
CRITIQUE
It is now possible to evaluate the extent to which Missouri courts use
criminal statutes to affect tort liability. That the influence is substantial is
evidenced by the negligence per se rule and by the fact that, in at least some
circumstances, intentional tort liability is founded on criminal statutes. How-
ever, when courts so borrow criminal standards from the legislature, they
are not completely controlled by the legislative pronouncement. It is impor-
64. Mo. REv. STAT. § 290.140 (1959).
65. Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956).
66. Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.780 (1959).
67. Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 1192, 295 S.W.2d 122, 126 (1956).
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tant to recognize that courts, rather than legislatures, make the initial deci-
sion to use criminal statutes in tort cases. The use of the excused breach
doctrine illustrates the courts' ability to borrow from the legislature while
retaining judicial control over civil liability.
Despite this, there are several examples of the courts' relying on what is,
at best, a weakly implied legislative intent to determine the extent to which
a criminal statute was to be used in a tort case. For example, in the inten-
tional tort case involving a breach of the workmen's compensation statute,
the court distinguished the "service letter" statute on insignificant grounds.
It is difficult to find an important difference between an existing evil and
an anticipated evil which was sufficient to cause the legislature to append
the criminal section to the workmen's compensation laws. Even less justi-
fiably, the workmen's compensation statute was held penal and non-
remedial because it provided a penalty for doing a proscribed act, but did
not first proscribe the act and separately list the penalty. Actually there
may well be a strong, though unstated, policy reason for distinguishing the
workmen's compensation statute from the "service letter" statute. Proving
a breach of the former would depend on ascertaining the employer's state
of mind, creating the danger that juries might uphold unfounded claims.
On the other hand, whether or not a letter has been written is easily estab-
lished.
Another rule based partly on supposed legislative intent is that there must
be a concomitant common law duty before a statute may be used to create
a duty in a negligence case. For example, ordinances requiring landlords
to remedy defective conditions on a tenant's leased premises cannot be used
to create a civil cause of action. Yet it appears that the landlord is better
able to remedy such conditions, at least if their existence is known. Further-
more, the landlord is in a better position than is the tenant to spread the
risk through insurance.
The class of hazards and class of plaintiffs rules of limitation provide a
third example of court reliance on legislative intent at the possible expense
of policy considerations. The stated reason for limiting liability is that un-
foreseeable plaintiffs, injured by unforeseeable hazards, should not be able
to recover. But when courts thus borrow the legislature's standard, they
are, in effect, also adopting the limits of the legislature's foresight. This
reliance seems undesirable. It is questionable to assume that the legislature
has considered whether the plaintiff and his injury were foreseeable. The
legislature was contemplating criminal liability, which is not contingent on
the occurrence of an injury to someone, and was not contemplating the
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limits which should confine the use of the criminal statute in affording a
civil recovery after an injury has occurred.
There are times when the policies of criminal law coincide to some degree
with the policies of tort law. When this occurs, the courts should use the
criminal law to influence civil liability, but only to the extent that such coin-
cidence occurs. The courts should realize that though the legislature has
suggested the standard by passing the statute, the decision to use the statute
to affect civil liability is court-made, and the ultimate effect of the statute
should be court-controlled.
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